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BOOK REVIEW
THE DNA STORY: AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
PAUL C. GIANNELLI"
HARLAN LEVY, AND THE BLOOD CRIED OUT (New York: Basic
Books, 1996) 223 pp.
Harlan Levy's book, And the Blood Cried Out: A Prosecutor's
Spellbinding Account of the Power of DNA, traces the use of DNA
evidence in criminal cases.! In 1985, Dr. Alec Jeffreys of the
University of Leicester, England, recognized the utility of using
DNA profiling in criminal cases.2 The first use of DNA profiling
in American courts came the following year.3 The first appellate
case, Andrews v. State,4 was reported in 1988. By January 1990,
forensic DNA analysis had been admitted into evidence "in at
least 185 cases by 38 States and the U.S. military."" Today, DNA
. Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case
Western Reserve University.
HARLAN LEVY, AND THE BLOOD CRIED OUT: A PROSECUTOR'S SPELLBINDING
ACCOUNT OF THE POWER OF DNA (1996). For a discussion of the admissibility of DNA
evidence, see 2 PAUL C. GIANNELu & EDwARDJ. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 1-
39 (2d ed. 1993).
2 See Peter Gill et al., Forensic Application of DNA 'Fingerprints," 318 NATURE 577
(1985); Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Individual-specific "Fingerprints" of Human DNA, 316
NATURE 76 (1985) [hereinafterJeffreys et al., Individual-specific 'ingerprints" of Human
DNA]; Alec J. Jeffreys et al., Hypervariable "Minisatellite" Regions In Human DNA, 314
NATURE 67 (1985).
"First introduced into U.S. criminal proceedings in 1986." OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, GENETIC WrINESS: FORENSIC USES OF DNA
TESTS 14 (1990) [hereinafter OTA REPORT].
' 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding DNA evidence admissible; no
defense experts testified at trial).
5 OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 14.
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evidence is admissible in every state and federal circuit-in one
form or the other.6
These developments are remarkable. No other scientific
technique has gained such widespread acceptance so quickly.
No other technique is as complex 7 or so subject to rapid change.
The change is so dramatic that during the 1980s, new DNA
technologies were introduced as cases litigating the older pro-
cedures worked their way through the court system.8 As Levy
6 See, e.g., United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837, 844-46 (9th Cir. 1996) (DNA-PCR
evidence satisfies Daubert); United States v. Beasley, 102 F.3d 1440, 1448 (8th Cir.
1996) (DNA-PCR, DQalpha and Polymarkers held admissible); United States v. Black
Cloud, 101 F.3d 1258, 1261 (8th Cir. 1996) (DNA for paternity admitted); United
States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1075 (10th Cir. 1994) (FBI method and statistical
probability evidence admitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1387 (1995); United States v.
Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 1994) (FBI statistics based on its Native
American database admissible, even though defendant's Navajo tribe may be
underrepresented), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 946 (1995); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d
540 (6th Cir. 1993).
See also Harmon v. State, 908 P.2d 434, 440-41 (Alaska 1995) (DNA evidence, both
RFLP and PCR, satisfies the Frye test; statistical analysis accompanying each form of
DNA testing also generally accepted); State v.Johnson, 922 P.2d 294, 300 (Ariz. 1996)
(en banc) (DNA modified ceiling principle generally accepted); Lindsey v. People,
892 P.2d 281 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (DNA statistics generally accepted); State v.
Sivri, 646 A.2d 169, 189-92 (Conn. 1994) (while DNA evidence generally accepted,
case remanded to decide if population frequency calculations are generally
accepted); People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721 (Ill. 1996) (RFLP statistics); State v.
Colbert, 896 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Kan. 1995) (DNA profile statistics generally accepted);
Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) (DNA statistics based
on ceiling principle admissible); State v. Bloom, 516 N.W.2d 159, 167 (Minn. 1994)
(random match probability based of NAS interim ceiling method held admissible);
State v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 471-72 (Mont. 1994) (RFLP analysis admitted); State v.
Vandebogart, 652 A.2d 671, 675 (N.H. 1994) (DNA calculations based on interim
ceiling principle satisfy Frye test); State v. Marcus, 683 A.2d 221, 231 (N.J. App. Div.
1996) (stating that the "product rule in DNA analysis is generally accepted in the
scientific community"); State v. Anderson, 881 P.2d 29, 47 (N.M. 1994) (FBI random
match probability statistics held admissible); People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 455-56
(N.Y. 1994) (Lifecodes DNA method generally accepted at time of trial (1988-89));
Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328, 332 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (DNA-RFLP match
and statistical calculations admissible); State v. Lyons, 924 P.2d 802 (Or. 1996) (DNA-
PCR admissible); State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304 (Wash. 1996) (en banc) (product
rule generally accepted).
7 Other scientific techniques such as voiceprints, hypnotically-refreshed testimony,
and the polygraph did not involve the number of steps or the detailed procedures
needed for DNA analysis.
8 RFLP, which stands for Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism, was the first
DNA test used in criminal cases. Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was the second
DNA test. The original type of PCR involved the DQ-alpha loci; later types of PCR in-
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observes, DNA evidence "raised issues at the cutting edge of
modem law and science." 9  Indeed, important developments
have occurred since the publication of Levy's book: the firstju-
dicial use of mitochondrial DNA;10 RFLP chemiluminescence;"
DNA from cats;1 2 and DNA from trees.13 In addition, Australian
scientists have reported retrieving usable DNA samples from the
inside of condoms worn as briefly as one minute without ejacu-
lation.
Finally, no other technique has been as potentially valuable
to the criminal justice system. 5 One court called DNA evidence
the "single greatest advance in the 'search for truth' . . . since
the advent of cross-examination. "1 Even its critics acknowledged
that "[aippropriately carried out and correctly interpreted,
DNA typing is possibly the most powerful innovation in foren-
sics since the development of fingerprinting in the last part of
the 19th Century."
7
volved "polymarkers," D1S80, and STRs (short tandem repeats). Levy recounts these
developments throughout the book. See LEvy, supra note 1, at 138-41 (discussing
PCR); id. at 144 (discussing DIS80); id. (discussing polymarker); id. at 144-45 (dis-
cussing STRs).
9 Id. at 21.
I0 See Mark Curriden, A New Evidence Too4 First Use of Mitochondrial DNA Test in a
U.S. Criminal Tria4 82 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (1996) (the rape-murder of a four-year-old girl
was solved from a small red hair found in the victim's throat). Previously, RFLP and
PCR were used, both of which test for DNA in the cell nucleus.
" United States v. Lowe, 954 F. Supp. 401 (D. Mass. 1996).
12 Marilyn A. Menottti-Raymond et al., Pet Cat Hair Implicates Murder Suspec 386
NATURE 774 (1997) (STR genotyping used in Canadian case).
"' State v. Bogan, 905 P.2d 515 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
14 Rolan A.H. van Oorschot & Maxwell K. Jones, DNA Fingerprints from Fingerprints,
387 NATURE 767 (1997).
'-'As Levy observes:
Of course, it is true that, over the long history of Anglo-American jurisprudence,
courts have opened their doors to numerous new forms of scientific evidence.
Many of these innovations have provoked controversy but few as much as DNA
evidence, for never before have we seen a new form of scientific findings so per-
suasive that it often stands above all other evidence, or lack of evidence, and by
itself spells the difference between conviction and acquittal.
LEVY, supra note 1, at 105.
16 People v. Wesley, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1988).
17 R.C. Lewontin & Daniel L. Hard, Population Genetics in Forensic DNA Typing, 254
Sci. 1745, 1746 (1991).
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The DNA story is a tale worth telling-even if it were not so
"spellbinding.",8 Although And the Blood Cried Out was written
for the general public, it is worthwhile reading for lawyers. Mr.
Levy's style is clear, concise, and readable. The book goes be-
yond DNA evidence; Levy describes other aspects of the crimi-
nal justice system, such as police interrogation techniques and
trial strategy, and then explains how DNA fits into this system.
In Part I, I address Levy's general observations about the justice
system, including comments on police interrogations, defense
attorneys, and juries. Part II critiques Levy's rendition of the
DNA story. Part III addresses the lessons that I draw from this
story. In my view, the criminal justice system was not prepared
to deal with DNA evidence. As a result, a number of significant
legal issues arose in the early DNA cases. They include: (1) use
of improper scientific procedures; (2) insufficient pretrial dis-
covery; (3) difficulty obtaining defense experts; and (4) lack of
independent scientific studies. These issues are important and
deserve more attention than Levy provides.
I. THE CRIVMNALJUSTICE SYSTEM
Overall, Levy excels at explaining how the criminal justice
system works. Several illustrations are noteworthy.
First, throughout his book, Levy tells the victims' stories.
Too often lawyers, including myself, talk about "rape cases" in
the abstract.19 Levy does not let us escape the real nature of
rape. He is graphic in some of his descriptions but is not sensa-
tionalistic. His description of the brutality and degradation of
the rape victims is palpable. For example, he reminds us that
"the injuries to the Central Park jogger were so severe that they
could not take the time to do a rape kit procedure until several
hours after she was brought in.,,20 The reader is also introduced
,Hopefully the subtitle was an agent's or publisher's idea.
9 In addition to homicide cases, DNA evidence is most often used in rape cases.
" LEW, supra note 1, at 80. The case was named for a rape victim whose anonymity
has been protected; she was attacked on April 19, 1989. "In reality, the crime was
more accurately [described as] the Central Park rampage, a series of attacks on many
victims carried out over the course of about an hour by a pack of teenagers, appar-
enty gone mad." Id. at 61-62.
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to the "East Side Slasher," Matias Reyes, a serial rapist who
stabbed his victim's eyes so they could not identify him.'
Second, Levy's description of police interrogation tech-
niques is quite informative. In explaining the questioning of
the East Side Slasher, he writes:
When detective Mike Sheehan was brought in to question Reyes about
the homicide, he had no hard evidence with which he could confront
him. He had nothing to work with but his skill at what he did for a liv-
ing, and some considerable charm. The rare ability to turn on the
charm for a low-life who has raped someone just hours earlier is an im-
portant part of a successful detective's arsenal.n
Levy then explains how Detective Sheehan misled Reyes into
confessing.23 Later, he explains how other New York City detec-
tives tricked a suspect in the Central Park Jogger case into mak-
ing incriminating comments, falsely telling the suspect that
there were "fingerprints on the jogger's pants or running
shorts."24
Levy also relates how police respond to the Miranda deci-
sion. One of the contradictions of Miranda is that the police are
entrusted with the responsibility of giving legal advice to a sus-
pect.25 Levy writes that the
Miranda warnings, advising the suspect that he need not talk, will have
been read with the verbal equivalent of a wink, in a tone and cadence
2' During the summer of 1989, three women were raped and stabbed in their eyes
on Manhattan's Upper East Side. One died. Id. at 3.
2 Id. at 7. Matias Reyes confessed to two of the rapes but not to the rape-murder.
Detective Sheehan later obtained a confession on the murder from Reyes. Id.
" Levy does not discuss the legality of these confessions. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &
JEROD.H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 6.2, at 447 (1984) (observing that in Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969), the "Court concluded that the 'fact that the police
misrepresented the statements that Rawis made is, while relevant, insufficient in our
view to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible.' Similarly, lower
courts have held confessions admissible when they were prompted by such misrepre-
sentations as that the murder victim was still alive, that nonexistent witnesses have
been found, that the murder weapon had been uncovered, that defendant's prints
were found at the crime scene, and that an accomplice had confessed and implicated
the defendant.") (footnotes omitted).
4 LEw, supra note 1, at 77.
2See STEPHEN A. SALTzBURG & DANIELJ. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 542
(5th ed. 1966) ("The educational aspect of Miranda has its own problems. The Court
was depending on the very police officers about whom it was concerned to give the
warnings. How effective could the Court have expected police officers to be as
teachers of constitutional rights?").
384 [Vol. 88
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suggesting that all in the room know that this is simply a formal legal ni-• 25
cety to be gotten past before they get down to business,2
Third, perhaps Levy's most insightful points concern his
courtroom adversary-the defense counsel. In the context of
the OJ. Simpson trial, he tells us that:
The best criminal defense attorneys are often distinguished from the
lesser lights by their focus on broad themes and their ability to marshall
facts to support those themes. A less qualified lawyer will simply quibble
with the prosecution's case, nitpicking every small inconsistency or con-
tradiction, reminding the jury at every opportunity that the burden of
proof is on the prosecution, that the defense has to prove nothing; when
the case is done, the lawyer takes his bows for a good try, and the client is
lead off to ajail.27
Levy goes on to state that the "best defense lawyers, from the
celebrated to the obscure, know that no matter what the law says
about who bears the burden of proof, they must pose a theory
or theories that the jury will see as supporting the client's inno-
cence and then develop facts that support this theory.
2 1
My only complaint concerning Levy's explanation of the
justice system is a statement that he makes about Bronx juries.
He writes that "Bronx juries are notoriously friendly to defen-
dants in criminal cases, much more so than those in Manhattan,
where I worked as a prosecutor."2 This is a startling statement,
one that cries out for an explanation. None is given. Are we to
read "race" between the lines?30 The reader needs more.
A. PROSECUTION VIEW
Mr. Levy served as a prosecutor, and he writes from that
perspective." This is neither unexpected, nor is it necessarily a
criticism. I would be surprised if his perspective was otherwise,
but it does manifest itself in some striking ways. For example, in
explaining plea bargaining, Levy writes:
26 LEw, supra note 1, at 2.
Id. at 158.28 Id.
2Id. at 34.
" In describing the OJ. Simpson case, Levy mentions that "the case was being tried
before a largely minority group jury in a city where the police had a well-established
reputation for abuse of minority men." I. at 160.
"' Levy served as an Assistant District Attorney in the Manhattan D.A.'s office for
several years, commencing in 1987.
1997]
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There are few decisions a prosecutor must make as difficult as the choice
between offering a defendant a lesser sentence on a plea bargain and go-
ing to trial. After a trial, a convicted defendant will likely get an ex-
tremely lengthy sentence, something close to what he deserves. But if he
is not convicted at trial, the defendant is a free man, free to go out and
32prey on society again.
The possibility that the "free man" might be an "innocent man,"
a fact buttressed by the lack of evidence (at least in the eyes of
the acquitting jury), never seems to occur to Levy. A newly re-
leased Department ofJustice report discusses the exoneration of
twenty-eight convicts through the use of DNA technology--
some of whom had been sentenced to death 3  The report
supports Levy's DNA argument, but it also raises other issues.
Prosecutors tried almost all of these cases (one was a guilty
plea); these prosecutors helped convict innocent people. This
ought to give prosecutors pause when automatically assuming
the guilt of a defendant. Indeed, Levy discusses one of these
cases, the Honaker case, in which prosecutors misused hair
evidence to obtain a conviction Levy notes that "[t]here was
no question that the state hair expert [at Honaker's trial] had
overstated the distinctiveness of the hair recovered from the
victim's shorts in his trial testimony."35 This comment is a gross
understatement. According to Levy, the expert testified: "It is
unlikely that that hair would match anyone other than the
defendant, but it is possible."36 At best, the expert could have
testified that the hairs were "consistent," which means that they
could have come from Honaker or thousands of other people.3 7
" LEw, supra note 1, at 33.
"3 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996)
[hereinafter EXONERATED BY SCIENCE]. See generally Elizabeth V. LaFollette, State v.
Hunt and Exculpatory DNA Evidence: When Is a New Trial Warranted, 74 N.C. L. REv.
1295 (1996).
" LEW, supra note 1, at 150-55. See also EXONERATED BY SCIENCE, supra note 33, at
57 (discussing the Honaker case).
Lav, supra note 1, at 153.
Id. at 152.
"7 One court has ruled that even the "consistent with" language goes too far. See
Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (excluding hair
comparison while observing that the court had "been unsuccessful in its attempts to
locate any indication that expert hair comparison testimony meets any of the re-
quirements of Daubert;" further, "[a]lthough the hair expert may have followed pro-
386 [Vol. 88
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A competent prosecutor should have known this.ss In addition,
the fact that the victim had been hypnotized prior to trial was
not revealed until the post-trial proceedings.3 This is a patent
constitutional violation4° Honaker spent ten years in prison.
Levy's prosecution perspective manifests itself in other con-
texts as well. In another passage, he observes that: "[C] riminal
juries often show a remarkable ability to make subtle distinc-
tions, sometimes to a fault, as they pore over and dissect evi-
dence.' ' Here, Levy is criticizing juries for being conscientious.
Yet, the law often requires the jury to make "subtle distinctions"
and demands that "they pore over and dissect evidence." In-
deed, the jury in the OJ. Simpson trial was criticized for not
pouring over the evidence.' Moreover, the jury serves other
purposes. As the United States Supreme Court has noted, de-
fendants in criminal cases are accorded the right to jury trial "in
order to prevent oppression by the Government" and that
"[p]roviding an accused with the right to be tried by ajury of his
peers [gives] him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt
cedures accepted in the community of hair experts, the human hair comparison re-
sults in this case were, nonetheless, scientifically unreliable."), rev'd on other grounds,
Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1997).
"There were other inconsistencies. "Honaker had a vasectomy in 1977, but the
vaginal swab recovered intact sperm .... The rapist spoke obsessively about Vietnam;
Honaker had never been there. Both the victim and her fiance were sure that the
rapist held the gun in his left hand, and Honaker was right-handed." LEw, supra note
1, at 153.
39 Id.
40 E.g., Orndorff v. Lockhart, 998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993) (prosecution's failure
to notify the defense that a witness had been hypnotized constituted a confrontation
violation because it deprived the accused of the opportunity to cross-examine the
witness on this issue), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1060 (1994); United States v. Miller, 411
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969) (new trial was granted because the prosecution failed to in-
form the defense that a key witness had undergone hypnosis); Brown v. State, 426 So.
2d 76, 80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("[D]ue process demands that counsel be af-
forded a fairer means by which to prepare his defense to this critical evidence.");
State v. Armstrong, 329 N.W.2d 386, 395 (Wis. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 946 (1983);
Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103, 105 (Wyo. 1983).
SLW, supra note 1, at 11.
42 See Paul Reidinger, Squeezing the Juice Out of O.J., 82 A.B.A. J. 92, 93 (1996)
("[Prosecutor Christopher] Darden knew the jury's swift decision was bad news
because '[t]welve people could not make an honest assessment of nine months of
testimony in just four hours.' The jurors apparently had made up their minds long
before the final arguments and possibly before the opening arguments.") (quoting
CHRISTOPHER DARDEN, IN CONTIEMPT (1996)).
PAUL C. GIANNELLI
or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or
eccentric judge."4" Levy fails to mention this point.
Levy's prosecutorial bent again surfaces in his discussion of
police interrogations. As noted above, Levy's realistic descrip-
tion of interrogation practices is a strong point of the book. But
Levy seems to overlook several contradictions. In describing the
Central Park Jogger case, he anticipates the defense counsel's
attacks on an accused's confession:
Once again, the police had a devastating confession. But once again,
there was a problem, for the defendant's statement included a major in-
accuracy, grist for the defense argument that these statements were not
firsthand accounts by people who had actually been there but recycled
stories fed to the defendants by the police. 44
It does not occur to Levy that if the police had taped this inter-
rogation this "problem" would not have arisen. Levy even in-
forms us that taping occurs only when the prosecutor arrives
and records a statement after the suspect has confessed to the
detectives.45 There is a reason that the police do not tape con-
fessions. Many suspects do not understand that oral, as well as
written and taped, confessions are admissible. 46 Instead of fo-
cusing on defense tactics, perhaps Levy should have addressed
this police tactic.
Levy also fails to connect the issue of false confessions to po-
lice interrogation techniques. In explaining the first DNA case
in Leicestershire County, England,47 Levy notes that the police
"' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968).
1
4 LEW, supra note 1, at 76.
" "It is only after a suspect has committed himself firmly to a story that an assistant
district attorney is called in and the suspect interviewed by the assistant district attor-
ney on videotape." Id. at 72.
4r In Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1987), the suspect said he would not pro-
vide a written statement without an attorney but was willing to talk with police. The
Supreme Court found a valid waiver as to the oral statements even though the sus-
pect's ambivalence about having an attorney indicated, at the very least, a limited un-
derstanding about the significance of oral statements. The Court stated that a
suspect's ignorance of the full consequences of his decision does not vitiate the vol-
untariness of his decision.
,7 See JOSEPH WAMBAuGH, THE BLOODING (1989) (discussing the investigation and




obtained a false confession from a suspect, Richard Buckland. 48
In 1986, Buckland confessed to one of two rape-murders that
had occurred in a small English town, which was a short dis-
tance from Dr. Jeffreys's laboratory. Buckland, however, would
not confess to the second murder, which the police believed was
so similar to the first murder that it had to have been commit-
ted by the same person. The police sought outJeffreys in an at-
tempt to tie Buckland to the second murder through DNA
analysis. Jeffreys surprised the police when he concluded that
both murders were committed by the same person but Buckand
was not the assailant.49 Levy apparently does not see a relation-
ship between Buckland's false confession and the deceptive in-
terrogation practices that he favorably described in the previous
chapter.
False confessions are an inherent risk of such high pressure
interrogation techniques.O In a taped interview made for a
NOVA television documentary on DNA evidence, Buckland was
asked why he had confessed to a crime that he did not commit.
He responded: "Theyjust say too much to you. Like you won't
get out of here .... No chance. No way. Then the pressure
began getting really hard. You just didn't have a chance." 1
Based on audiotapes of the interview, the writer, Joseph
Wambaugh, described the interrogation in the following terms:
4' LEvw, supra note 1, at 28. For some reason, Levy refers to the suspect as George
Howard. Other sources, including the NOVA tape which includes an interview of the
suspect, see infra note 51, identify the suspect as Richard Buckland. See also OTA
REPORT, supra note 3, at 8 ("After prolonged questioning, [Buckland] made a graphic
confession to killing Ashworth.").
49 "Not only was he innocent of the first murder but he had falsely confessed to the
rape and murder of [the second victim]." LE, supra note 1, at 29. Another person,
Colin Pitchfork, later confessed to both crimes and his DNA matched the crime scene
evidence.
o See generally Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear?: Confession in Law and Litera-
ture, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1996); Richard A. Leo, Criminal Law: The Impact of
Miranda Revisited, 86J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621 (1996); Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The
Psychology of False Confessions, 57 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 93 (1989) (discussing coerced-
complaint confessions and coerced-internalized confessions); Arye Rattner, Convicted
But Innocent: Wrongful Conviction in the Criminal Justice System, 12 LAw & Hum. BEHAV.
283 (1988).
" NOVA, MURDER, RAPE AND DNA (1988) (Films For The Humanities & Sciences).
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The kitchen porter was getting so upset he was answering in non
sequiturs."
But by then, the boy had back-pedaled and was denying he'd had
prior sexual experience .... 53
And the boy looked from one to the other and answered, "I can't
remember. I probably really went mad, and I don't know it!" 4
Then he became angry and cried out, "I never touched her! Why
should I get blamed?" . . . And suddenly, in the midst of a confession
that was confused, disjointed, bizarre, the boy said something eminently
sensible: "I want a blood test!"
55
Despite these events, Buckland was charged based upon his
confession.
Buckland was not the only case of this type. David Vasquez,
who was later exonerated by DNA, was also convicted based
upon a false confession.56 Indeed, Vasquez, who was borderline
retarded, pled guilty. His confession was based on a dream,7
and "his account was incoherent and inconsistent. 5 ' First, the
police convinced Vasquez that his fingerprints were found at the
scene, and then they fed him the details of the crime:
[Detective]: Tell us how you did it.
Vasquez: I grabbed the knife and just stabbed her, that's all.
[Detective]: Oh David. No David! Now if you would have told
us the way it happened we could believe you a lit-
tle bit better.
Vasquez: I only say that it did happen and I did it, my fin-
gerprints were on it.
[Detective]: You hung her.
Vasquez: What?
[Detective]: You hung her!
Vasquez: Okay. So I hung her.5 9
52 WAMBAUGH, supra note 47, at 125.
53Id. at 129.
54 d. at 131.
5 Id. at 132.
16 See EXONERATED BYSCIENCE, supra note 33, at 73 (discussing Vasquez case).
17 PAUL MONES, STALKING JusTicE: TFE DRAMATIc TRUE STORY OF THE DETECrrvE
WHO FIRST USED DNA TESTING TO CATCH A SERIAL KILIER 54 (1995) ("I can't help you






The trial judge suppressed two of Vasquez's statements,
noting: "Here, we have a two-on-one situation at the police
station, the use of the good guy/bad guy methods of
interrogation and the careful use of factual misstatements of
evidence." 60 In addition, "[a]fter several minutes of cajoling the
[defense psychiatrist] was able to persuade David that two plus
two was three.'
II. THE DNA STORY
Levy's clear explanation of DNA evidence is the strongest
part of the book. By using actual cases, Levy provides valuable
context for the reader as well as an interesting story. To explain
DNA evidence and how it fits into the criminal justice system,
Levy uses a number of high profile cases-the World Trade Cen-
ter bombing, the East Side Slasher, the Central ParkJogger, and
the O.J. Simpson case. Some cases are used to show the power
of DNA profiling. For example, in the World Trade Center
prosecution, an FBI expert matched saliva on an envelope sent
by the terrorists to the N.Y Times with the DNA of one of the
defendants.62 Many of the cases that Levy discusses would not
have been solved or successfully prosecuted without DNA evi-
dence. In contrast to these cases, the Central Park Jogger
prosecution is used to illustrate a case where DNA evidence was
missing and how the prosecution dealt with this problem.0 Levy
Id. at 60.
" Id. at 58.
2 Andre Blum, Trade Center Case Turns On Forensics, NAT'L LJ., Oct. 25, 1993, at 8
("Prosecutors said [Mr. Nidal Ayyad's] saliva was found on the envelope containing a
letter to the New York Times proclaiming the Liberation Army, 5th Battalion, had
bombed the WTC in response to U.S. aid to Israel."). See LEVY, supra note 1, at 144
(discussing this case).
A news account of the Central Park Jogger case commented: "Among the de-
fense's strongest points in attacking the prosecution's case was the surprising absence
of physical evidence-no weapons, no blood stains, no strands of hair, no pieces of
skin, no footprints link any of the teenagers to the crimes." Rorie Sherman, Technol-
ogy, Emotion Key in Jogger Case, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 20, 1990, at 8. See also Tim Golden, Ju-
rors injogger Trial Remember a Relentless Period of Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1990, at B4
("The youths claimed not to have penetrated the jogger, and there was no clear
physical proof that they had.").
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also discusses cases in which DNA analysis exonerated the inno-
cent,6e sometimes after defendants had spent years in prison.
Levy uses another case to demonstrate the power of DNA
databanks. Jean Ann Broderick was sexually assaulted and mur-
dered on November 17, 1991 in Minneapolis.65 There were no
suspects until the police entered a DNA profile extracted from
crime scene evidence into the state DNA databank.6 It was the
"first case in American history in which the new tool of DNA
data banking was used to solve a rape or murder case."67 While
the capability to solve a "cold hit" case, one without a suspect, is
an important development, it also raises serious privacy issues
that Levy does not address.68 This is unfortunate because more
and more states are enacting legislation to obtain samples from
convicted prisoners for DNA databanks. Moreover, the DNA
6 See LEaw, supra note 1, at 96 ("On January 9, 1991, the prosecutors went to court
and dismissed the case againstJohn Davis. In doing so, they based their decision on




6 7 Id. at 128.
Challenges to DNA databank statutes on constitutional grounds have been un-
successful. See Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996) ("[While ob-
taining and analyzing the DNA or saliva of an inmate convicted of a sex offense is a
search and seizure implicating Fourth Amendment concerns, it is a reasonable search
and seizure. This is so in light of an inmate's diminished privacy rights; the minimal
intrusion of saliva and blood tests; and the legitimate government interest in the in-
vestigation and prosecution of unsolved and future criminal acts by the use of DNA in
a manner not significantly different from the use of fingerprints.") (citations omit-
ted) (also rejecting Fifth Amendment, due process, equal protection, and cruel and
unusual punishment claims); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995) (uphold-
ing an Oregon statute that required all persons convicted of murder or a sexual of-
fense to provide blood samples for a DNA databank); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302
(4th Cir.) (same result but under a different Fourth Amendment analysis-the dimin-
ished privacy rights of convicted persons), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992); Sanders v.
Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496, 499-501 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (forcible drawing of blood for
DNA databank violates neither the Fourth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments); In re
Maricopa County Juv. Action, 930 P.2d 496 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996) (juvenile sex of-
fenders); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1080-81 (Wash. 1993) (rejecting a search and
seizure challenge to DNA identification sex offender law, according to the court, this
provision constituted a valid regulatory search). See generally Harold Krent, Of Diaries
and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49 (1995);
Yale H. Yee, Note, Criminal DNA Data Banks: Revolution For Law Enforcement or Threat to
Individual Privacy ?, 22 AM.J. Cium. L. 461 (1995).
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Identification Act of 1994 provides federal funds to assist is this
endeavor.6 9
A. PROSECUTORIAL PERSPECTIVE
Levy's prosecution perspective also surfaces when he tells
the DNA story. He relies on prosecutor Rockne Harmon's arti-
cle, which was published in this Journal,7° but does not cite the
articles of defense attorneys Barry Scheck,71 Peter Neufeld,2 and
William Thompson, 73 all of whom have written significant arti-
cles on DNA evidence. This perspective makes Levy vulnerable
to a charge of selective quoting. For example, he cites the 1990
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) report as follows: "Its
most crucial finding, however, was devastating to the DNA
debunkers. Testing of DNA is reliable, concluded the report,
and questions about the validity of DNA typing are 'red herrings
that do the courts and the public a disservice."'7 4 But he fails to
mention that the report also recognized that:
Serious questions are raised ... about how best to ensure that any par-
ticular test result is reliable. These questions focus on data interpretation,
how to minimize realistic human error, and the appropriate level of
monitoring to ensure quality. Such questions, which stem from actual
court cases, underscore the need to develop both technical and opera-
tional standards now.75
The OTA Report also raised the substructure issue,76 which con-
cerned the population frequencies used to show the discrimina-
L6Lw, supra note 1, at 209 (listing statutes).
70 Rockne P. Harmon, Legal Criticisms of DNA Typing Where's the Beef 84J. GRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1993).
7 Barry C. Scheck, DNA andDaubert, 15 CARxozo L. REv. 1959 (1994).
72PeterJ. Neufeld, Have You No Sense of Decency?, 84J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 189
(1993).
7*'William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests:
Lessons From the "DNA War," 84 J. CGRIM. L. & CRIINOLOGY 22 (1993); William C.
Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identifi-
cation Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45 (1989).
7 LEvy, supra note 1, at 56 (quoting OTA RPORT, supra note 3, at 8).
75 OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 83 (emphasis in original).
76 The Report stated:
One critical factor. These basic calculations are only valid when applied to
populations in which the DNA fragments are statistically independent. Other-
wise, the value calculated might greatly underestimate the true occurrence of the
pattern in the general population-making a match seem rarer than it actually
is. Essentially, the population must be one where individuals randomly marry
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tory power of DNA evidence. This issue played a critical role in
later DNA cases and required the National Academy of Sciences
to issue a second DNA report.7
Another illustration is Levy's discussion of United States v.
Yee, 78 a case that is significant for several reasons. First, Yee was
the initial DNA case that involved the FBI's profiling system.
Second, Magistrate James Carr held an extensive six-week hear-
ing and wrote an exhaustive report, in which he discussed both
the scientific and legal issues concerning DNA evidence. Third,
each side was represented by exceptional attorneys79 who had
access to impressive expert witnesses. °
Yee was a major test for DNA evidence, and it passed-but
not without criticism. The magistrate wrote that "the F.B.I. pro-
gram of proficiency testing has serious deficiencies, even with-
out consideration of the troubling hint in the record of an
impulse at one point to destroy some of the small amount of test
data that had been accumulated earlier.""' In another passage,
the magistrate stated that he "did not either disregard or dis-
count the accuracy of many of the criticisms about the remarka-
bly poor quality of the F.B.I.'s work and infidelity to important
scientific principles. 8 2 Finally, he noted that "research must be
undertaken to devise a means of responding more fully to the
possibilities of substructure.8 3 Unfortunately, Levy does not ex-
84pose the reader to these comments.
A third example of Levy's selective usage is his citation to an
article by Eric Lander and Bruce Budowle, entitled DNA Finger-
and reproduce, so that distinct subgroups are absent. In such freely mixed popu-
lations, there will be no correlation between the alleles on the matemal and pa-
ternal chromosomes (Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium) and no correlation between
alleles at different loci (no linkage disequilibrium).
Id. at 67.
See infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
7" 134 F.R.D. 161 (N.D. Ohio 1991), aff'd sub. nom., United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d
540 (6th Cir. 1993).7
'
9 Barry Scheck was one of the defense attorneys, and James Wooley was one of the
prosecutors.
80 See infra text accompanying notes 139-40.
81 Yee, 134 F.P.D. at 208.
8 2 Id. at 210.
8Id.
8 See LEVY, supra note 1, at 111, for a discussion of Yee
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printing Dispute Laid to Rest.s The article was significant because
Lander was an early critic of the forensic use of DNA evidence
and Budowle is the FBI's top DNA expert. Citing this article,
Levy writes that "[t]he momentum [toward accepting DNA evi-
dence] snowballed in October 1994, when a major advocate and
a leading critic of DNA evidence jointly published an article de-
claring that the controversy 'has been resolved."'' But Levy fails
to note that the Lander and Budowle article also contained a
number of troubling statements. The authors wrote: "When it
first burst on the scene, the supporting scientific literature con-
sisted of a mere handful of papers."87 Another passage read:
The initial outcry over DNA typing standards concerned laboratory prob-
lems: poorly defined rules for declaring a match; experiments without
controls; contaminated probes and samples; and sloppy interpretation of
autoradiograms. Although there is no evidence that these technical fail-
ings resulted in any wrongful convictions, the lack of standards seemed
to be a recipe for trouble.8
Yet, during the period to which these comments are addressed,
defendants were sentenced to death on the basis of DNA evi-
dence. 89
B. DNA MISCONCEPTIONS
There are at least three common misconceptions (perhaps
"myths") about DNA evidence, and Levy's treatment of these is-
sues is only partially successful. I have labeled these misconcep-
tions: (1) "It'sjust like a fingerprint!"; (2) "What's a few decimal
points?"; and (3) defense counsel "hypocrisy."
1. "It's Just Like a Fingerprintf'
Fingerprints are considered the most reliable type of scien-
tific evidence.90 They are unique, they do not change over time,
Eric S. Lander & Bruce Budowle, DNA Fingerprinting Dispute Laid to Rest, 371
NATURE 735 (1994).
m LEvW, supra note 1, at 123 (quoting Lander & Budowle).
'7Lander & Budowle, supra note 85, at 735.
"Id.
89 See infra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (discussing the execution of Timo-
thy Spencer).
' See generaly People v. Adamson, 165 P.2d 3, 12 (Cal. 1946) ("Fingerprints are the
strongest evidence of identity of a person and under the circumstances of the present
1997] 395
PAUL C. GIANNELL[
and the comparison is relatively easy to explain to the jury.
Thus, it is not surprising that the proponents of new scientific
techniques often invoke favorable comparisons to fingerprints.
For example, firearms identification has been described as a bal-
listic "fingerprint"9' and neutron activation analysis as a "nuclear
fingerprint."92  Fiber evidence has been touted as "nearly" as
valuable as fingerprint evidence.93 In drug analysis, a molecule's
infrared spectrophotometric spectrum has sometimes been re-
ferred to as its fingerprint.94 In one of the IRA cases, a British
prosecutor incorrectly stated that certain tests for bomb resi-
dues "were like fingerprints."95 Perhaps the most far-fetched
comparison occurred during an evidentiary hearing in the Mike
Tyson trial. The prosecutor argued that "state of mind is like
fingerprint evidence. 96 In just about every instance the finger-
print comparison is more misleading than helpful. None of
these techniques are as unique as fingerprints.
Further, some techniques are intentionally named to imply
such a comparison. This was the case with "voiceprint" evi-
dence.97 In the early 1960s, Lawrence Kersta, the developer of
the technique, began to champion the technique as a means of
voice identification. According to Kersta, the technique was
case they were alone sufficient to identify the defendant as the criminal."), aff'd, 332
U.S. 46 (1947); 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, at 481 ("[N]o impression
is as important as a fingerprint. . . . [C] rime laboratories rely on fingerprints more
heavily than on any other type of impression.").
"' See Calvin H. Goddard, Scientific Identification of Firearms and Bullets, 17J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 254, 260 (1926).
' See Comment, The Evidentiaiy Uses of Neutron Activation Analysis, 59 C.IF . L. REV.
997, 1029 (1971) (phrase "nuclear fingerprint" can be "quite misleading").
"' See 2 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, at 374 (One expert "has been
quoted as stating that fiber evidence can be nearly as valuable as fingerprint evidence
in identifying a criminal. The use of the adverb 'nearly' is well-advised .. ").
9' See id. at 306 ("Some commentators refer to a molecule's IR spectrum as its fin-
gerprint.").
95 Sir John May, Interim Report on the Maguire Case at 25 (July 9, 1990) (on file
with author). The case against the Maguires developed out of an investigation of an
IRA terrorist bombing of a public house in Guilford, England, on October 5, 1974.
The prosecution experts used thin layer chromatography (TLC) to detect nitroglyc-
erin (NG), a test that could identify but not quantify NG. Id. at 21. At trial, these ex-
perts testified falsely that the TLC test was specific for NG and no other substance.
PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 2, 1992, at 6D.
For a discussion, see 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINIELRIED, supra note 1, at 295-315.
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"[m]uch like fingerprint identification."" Speech scientists,
however, noted that fingerprints and voiceprints are "funda-
mentally different from each other"9 and that "the differences
between them seem to exceed the similarities."'00 Eventually,
courts also criticized the term, commenting that the "use of the
term 'voiceprint,' with its overtones of 'fingerprint,' gives voice
spectrographic identification an aura of absolute certainty and
accuracy which is neither justified by the facts nor claimed by
experts in the field."101
Jeffreys used the term "DNA fingerprint" from the begin-
ning,1 and the press quickly adopted phrases such as "biologi-
cal fingerprint. 10 3  Levy's reaction to this misconception is
ambiguous. At one point, he writes that 'Jeffreys's approach
provided results so definitive that it could have been fairly char-
acterized as a fingerprint. 10 4 But in another passage, he insight-
fully observes:
In court cases, witnesses for the prosecution frequently testified that no
two individuals other than identical twins have the same DNA. This
statement, absolutely true as a matter of scientific fact, can be highly mis-
leading if it leads us to believe that the power of DNA analysis lies in its
ability to identify and analyze all the characteristics of DNA unique to
each individual. Science does not yet have that power.05
Lawrence G. Kersta, Speaker Recognition and Identification by Voiceprints, 40 CONN.
B.J. 586, 586 (1966). He also stated that his experiments showed that the technique's
accuracy for correct identifications was "greater than 99 percent." Id. at 591. See also
Lawrence G. Kersta, Voiceprint Identification, 196 NATURE 1253 (1962); Lawrence G.
Kersta, Voiceprint Identification Infallibility, 34J. ACOUSTICAL SOC'YAM. 1978 (1962).
9 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE
IDENTIFICATIONS 6 (1979).
"' Richard Bolt et al., Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms; A Scientist's View of
its Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 ACoUSTICAL SoC'YAM. 597,599 (1970).
'0' United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 465 n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1019 (1975). Accord United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1197 n.5 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979); State v. Gortarez, 686 P.2d 1224, 1233 n.2 (Ariz.
1984); Cornett v. State, 450 N.E.2d 498, 500 (Ind. 1983).
"0 SeeJeffreys et al., Individual-specific 'Tingerprints" of Human DNA, supra note 2.




' LEVY, supra note 1, at 26. On the same page, Levy notes thatJeffreys named his
approach "genetic fingerprinting." Id.
... Id. at 24.
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In short, DNA evidence (as opposed to DNA) is not a fingerprint,
and it is misleading to imply that it is.
2. "VWat's a Few Decimal Points?'
A second misconception is that a few decimal points in this
context is unimportant-i.e., that reporting a probability of 1 in
100,000.00 or 1 in 1,000,000.00 is inconsequential. As Dr. Ken-
neth Kidd of Yale University reportedly stated: "'It makes abso-
lutely no difference to me if the number is 1 in 800,000 or 1 in 5
million' . . . . [I]t probably doesn't matter to a jury either."'0'
This "what's a few decimal points" comment is telling. Kidd,
who testified as a prosecution expert in the Yee case, may be cor-
rect, but for over 200 years the Constitution has entrusted that
determination to juries not scientists-and shouldn't the
placement of the decimal point favor the accused? Moreover, a
few decimal points may indeed make a significant difference.
Levy points out why:
In cases where there is a great deal of other evidence against a defen-
dant, modesty in stating the significance of a DNA match may not matter
for all practical purposes .... But in those criminal cases where there is
little evidence against a defendant other than a DNA match, the size of
the numbers stating the match's significance may be the difference be-
tween conviction and exoneration.
11
7
In other words, the decimal point is most important (perhaps
determinative) where the prosecution has the least amount of
"other" evidence. Of course, one reason that may contribute to
a lack of "other" evidence is the innocence of the accused.
3. Defense Attorney Hypocrisy
Levy perpetuates one of the canards raised in the DNA de-
bates-that defense attorneys are hypocrites, championing DNA
when it exculpates their clients but not when it incriminates
their clients. He writes: "Defense lawyers could pick and
choose between those cases in which they liked DNA results and
those in which they did not, relying on favorable DNA results
'0 Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts Over DNA Fingerprinting, 254 SCI. 1721, 1721 (1991).
'07 LEW, supra note 1, at 112-13.
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and attacking DNA tests that implicated their clients."'' 8 First,
Levy fails to acknowledge that this defense position has a valid
scientific basis; that is, the lack of a "match" at any loci defini-
tively excludes the suspect, whereas a match at even several loci
is not conclusive. 1 9 This is true of other types of scientific evi-
dence as well. For example, if type 0 blood is found on a
bloody dagger at a murder scene (and the victim is not type 0),
a person with A, B, or AB blood type is automatically ex-
cluded. 10 In contrast, a person with type 0 blood could have
contributed the blood, but 43% of the population also has this
blood type.' The same is true of bitemark evidence-deter-
mining that two samples do not match is often both readily ap-
parent and definitive, whereas a "match" is not."
2
Second, in a very important sense defense attorneys cannot
"pick and choose." Public defenders are assigned cases, and de-
fense attorneys are ethically required to contest evidence, in-
cluding DNA profiling, if their clients exercise the
constitutional right to trial by jury. Instead of implying hypoc-
risy, the reader would have been better served if Levy had pro-
vided an explanation of the constitutional role that defense
attorneys play in a free society."
3
'" Id. at 57.
,09 SeeJudith A. McKenna et al., Reference Guide on Forensic DNA Evidence, in FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFC EVIDENCE 274, 297 (1994) ("If a
profile match is declared, it means only that the DNA profile of the suspect is
consistent with that of the source of the crime sample. The crime sample may be
from the suspect or from someone else whose profile, using the particular probes
involved, happens to match that of the suspect. Expert testimony concerning the
frequency with which the observed alleles are found in the appropriate comparison
population is necessary for the finder of fact to make an informed assessment of the
incriminating value of this match.").
- See generally 1 GIANNELi & hImNuERED, supra note 1, at 538-46 (discussing
blood group testing).
.' See id. at 570.
1' See id. at 361 ("It is easier to conclude that a person's dentition and a bite mark
do not match than it is to find a match. This is due to the fact that any unexplained
inconsistency between the bite mark and the dentition means that the suspect could
not have made the bite mark.").
"3 In a different context, the Supreme Court has stated: "[I]f the staffs submis-
sions include materials which are susceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is pre-




Finally, some prosecutors selectively fight DNA evidence.
Indeed, prosecutors are often criticized on the same point that
Levy raises against defense attorneys:
Prosecutors are enthusiastic about using DNA to imprison people, but
resist having the tables turned. For example, Suffolk County, N.Y., Dis-
trict Attorney James Catterson fought [Kerry] Kotler's appeals for DNA
tests for two years. "If we keep introducing new evidence, there is no
stability in the system," he said. It was Catterson's second such defeat in
three months: he resisted similar pleas from Leonard Callace, who was
convicted of sexual assault, until October, when tests, along with the cir-
cumstances of the crime, showed that Callace-imprisoned for six
years-could not be guilty. Gatterson remains unconvinced of Kotler's
innocence. He suggests that samples were somehow contaminated in
the lab, but given the tests, he has no plan to retry him.1
4
In the Rickey Hammond case, a kidnaping and rape prosecu-
tion tried in Hartford, Connecticut, a DNA expert from the FBI
testified for the defense, he said that semen stains taken from the
victim's panties did not come from Hammond. Nevertheless,
the jury, at the prosecutor's urging, convicted."5 Hammond's
conviction was reversed on appeal, and he was acquitted at a re-
trial.
16
There are other examples. In State v. Woodall,"7 prosecutors
claimed PCR-DNA was unreliable when it was offered to exon-
erate Woodall, who was seeking a new trial. Woodall was later
released from prison."" In Dabbs v. Vergari,"9 the defense had to
go to court to have evidentiary samples subjected to DNA analy-
sis; the defendant had been convicted of rape in 1984.
"' Kevin Krajick, Genetics in the Courtroom: Controversial DNA Testing Can Clear a Sus-
pect, NEwswTEK Jan. 11, 1993, at 64; see also EXONERATED BY SCIENCE, supra note 33, at
41 (discussing Leonard Callace case); id. at 61 (discussing Kerry Kotler's case).
"'Jack Ewing, Connecticut Jury Disregards DNA Test, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 23, 1990, at 9.
116 See EXONERATED BY SCIENCE, supra note 33, at 54-55; see also State v. Hammond,
604 A.2d 793 (Conn. 1992).
"1 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989) (In the original case, the West Virginia Supreme
Court upheld the admissibility of DNA evidence, but a post-trial test proved inconclu-
sive, because an insufficient sample existed for RFLP analysis; Woodall was later ex-
onerated by PCR analysis).
"' PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 27, 1991, at 3C. The Woodall case is discussed in Paul C.
Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientic Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent
Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 439 (1997). See also EXONERATED BY
SCIENCE, supra note 33, at 74-76.




Levy provides a well structured account of the tactics of
both prosecutors12' and defense attorneys in dealing with DNA
evidence. One comment, however, is puzzling. Near the end of
the book, Levy comments:
Often criminal defense lawyers are just as hesitant, if not more hesitant,
to push for DNA testing. Hardened by long exposure to career crimi-
nals, many defense lawyers start off believing that their clients are guilty,
regardless of their clients' protestations that they were not within miles
of the scene of the crime on the day in question. As a consequence,
many criminal defense attorneys are wary of ordering a test in each indi-
vidual case that may force them to face that their client has been lying to
them-and that could potentially be admitted at trial to prove their cli-
ent's guilt. This presents the criminal defense attorney with a difficult
choice: Forgo DNA testing, and risk the conviction of an innocent per-
son, or request such testing and possibly aid the conviction of the law-
yer's own client.1
This dilemma does not seem all that "difficult." If a client insists
she is innocent and there is a test that would help establish that
innocence, the defense attorney has little choice. Of course, a
competent attorney would only request the test after the case
had been thoroughly investigated and the consequences of a
negative test result explained to the client. A similar issue arose
in polygraph stipulation cases. In People v. Reedr,122 a California
court of appeals held that a defense counsel "who, in advance of
the examination, stipulates that a defendant will submit to a
polygraph examination and the results will be admissible at trial
demonstrates incompetence."'2 This decision was subsequently
vacated, and the defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel
claim rejected.12 4 Later cases also reject such claims. For exam-
ple, in one case, the court held that when counsel agrees to an
examination after the defendant insists on his innocence, there
'" Some prosecutors believe that the direct examination of the prosecution DNA
expert should be no more than half an hour. See James R. Wooley, Presenting DNA
Evidence at Trial: The "K.LS.S. Principle," 1 PROFILES IN DNA 3 (1997) (K.I.S.S. stands
for "Keep it simple, stupid.").
" LEvy, supra note 1, at 196.
12 129 Cal. Rptr. 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
1 Id. at 648.
124 People v. Reeder, 135 Cal. Rptr. 421, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).
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is no incompetence.ss In this situation, the defense counsel has
no choice.
Requesting an independent test by a defense expert is risky,
however, only if the prosecution is able to use the test results at
trial.2 6 This is a rather murky legal area. Usually, prosecution
discovery extends only to experts that the defense intends to call
as witnesses. 2 7 Moreover, in the case of a nontestifying defense
expert, some jurisdictions recognize the applicability of the
work product or attorney-client privilege in this context. 28
Some courts have also recognized a Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel argument.12 But these cases are
not universally accepted. Moreover, there is nothing to prevent
the prosecutor from asking the government expert if there was
sufficient DNA remaining for a defense re-test ° and perhaps
asking whether some DNA was in fact offered or turned over to
the defense.
Perhaps, a more interesting defense tactic concerns a re-
quest to have a defense expert present during prosecution DNA
testing. This tactic may backfire, however. What is the expert's
role in this context? If the defense expert is present and does
not object to the testing procedures, the prosecution can use
the defense expert's silence as an imprimatur for the test re-
sults-whether or not the defense expert testifies. If the de-
'2 People v. Berry, 173 Cal. Rptr. 137, 143 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). Accord State v.
Sloan, 545 A.2d 230, 235 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). See generally Gregory G.
Sarno, Annotation, Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal Client Regard-
ingHypnosis and Truth Tests, 9 A.L.R. 4th 354 (1981) (discussing competency of repre-
sentation concerning defense counsel's handling of matters pertaining to polygraph
tests).
26 See generally Prince v. San Diego County Super. Ct., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 855 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (DNA sample divided between prosecution and defense; denial of Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to require presence of prosecu-
tion representative during defense testing).
'2 See 1 GANNE & IMWINKELD, supra note 1, at 101 (discussing prosecution
discovery).
128 See id. at 162-63 (discussing attorney-client privilege as applied to experts).
'2 Id. at 164-65.
"30 See Wooley, supra note 120, at 3 (recommending that the prosecution expert be
asked the following question: "If someone disagrees with your result, is there a scien-
tific way to check if you got the right answer? (the defendant has the ability to retest the




fense expert criticizes the testing at trial, the prosecution can
ask the expert on cross-examination why the expert did not ob-
ject to the testing procedures at the time of the testing. Here,
the prosecutor could argue that, if the defense was really inter-
ested in valid test results, the defense expert would have raised
these concerns during the test. This is similar to the problem
that defense attorneys face when they represent a client at a
lineup.31
D. THE OUT-OF-COURT BATTLES
One of the most fascinating aspects of the DNA story is the
out-of-court battles, which involved not only the attorneys but
also experts and reporters. Levy spends a good part of his book
recounting the developments of these battles. At other times,
however, he fails to acknowledge his own participation in this
phenomenon. For example, he calls People v. Castro, a case dis-
cussed later in this article,3 2 a "public relations debacle"' s3 -
without any appreciation of how unusual such a description of a
judicial opinion is. Judicial opinions are often described as
good, bad, significant, misunderstood, and so forth-but not as
"public relations" problems.
The out-of-court battles originated in the early press reac-
tion to the use of DNA- evidence in criminal cases. The popular
press trumpeted DNA evidence as "foolproof"'  and "revolu-
tionary."135 Moreover, the private DNA laboratories, Lifecodes
and Cellmark, promoted DNA's use by claiming that it had "the
power to identify one individual in the world's population" and
"the chance that any two people will have the same DNA print is
"- See 1 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 23, § 7.3(e), at 576 (discussing whether de-
fense counsel waives any objection by not asserting it at the lineup); Francis A. Gilli-
gan, Eyewitness Identification, 58 MIL. L. REv. 183, 201 (1972); Panel Discussion, The Role
of the Defense Lawyer at a Line-up in Light of the Wade, Gilbert and Stovall Decisions, 4
CGlM. L. BULL. 273, 290 (1968).
1 See infra text accompanying notes 174-86.
1- LEVY, supra note 1, at 52.
' DNA Prints: A Foolproof Crime Test, Tnm, Jan. 26, 1987, at 66.
'3 Anastasia Toufexis, Convicted by Their Genes: A New Forensic Test is Revolutionizing
Criminal Prosecutions, TME, Oct. 31, 1988, at 74.
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one in 30 billion.' '3 6 "Cellmark entitled one of its informational
brochures DNA Fingerprinting, The Ultimate Identification
Test.' 37 As Levy notes, the Castro case dispelled much of this
initial euphoria.3
The most important battle over the validity of DNA evi-
dence involved respected scientists. Dr. Richard C. Lewontin of
Harvard University and Dr. Daniel Hard of Washington Univer-
sity testified for the defense in Yee,' s9 the first case involving the
FBI's DNA profiling procedures. The prosecution had its own
prominent experts, including Dr. Thomas Caskey of Baylor Uni-
versity and Dr. Kenneth K. Kidd of Yale University. After the
magistrate ruled that the DNA evidence was admissible, Lewon-
tin and Hard wrote a paper on their views that was accepted by
Science. Lewontin and Hard stated that the estimates of the
probability of a matching DNA profile "as currently calculated,
are unjustified and generally unreliable.'4 0
Prosecutors and pro-DNA experts were afraid of this arti-
cle.' 4' A paper by a Harvard scientist that was accepted by one of
the foremost scientific journals after peer review would cause
problems. Consequently, the editors of Science changed the
normal practice of publishing rebuttals in later issues and ac-
tively sought out a rebuttal article for the same issue. Accord-
ing to a Science staff reporter:
"6 PeterJ. Neufeld & Neville Colman, When Science Takes the Witness Stand, So. AM.,
May 1990, at 46, 50.
'" Dan Burk, DNA Identification: Possibilities and Pitfalls Revisited, 31 JUMMETRICSJ.
53, 85 n.19 (1990).
For a discussion of Castro, see infra text accompanying notes 174-86.
, See supra text accompanying notes 78-83 (discussing Yee).
"'Lewontin & Hart, supra note 17, at 1750.
Levy describes the bases of these fears. See LEw, supra note 1, at 111 ("[t] he im-
pending publication of their article threatened the admissibility of DNA analysis in a
way that their courtroom testimony never could"); id. ("[sluch publication can have
substantial consequences when courts are trying to determine whose views enjoy gen-
eral acceptance within the scientific community"); id. at 112 ("[b]ut an article by a
Harvard scientist in the nation's leading scientific journal would be much harder to
discount").
,' Cases and Commentaries, in PROnSSIONAL ETHICS REP., Spring 1992, at 2 ("[T]he
normal procedure followed by Science is to publish rebuttals in a subsequent issue and




In mid-October Caskey and Kidd, who had both gotten hold of the pa-
per, cornered one of Science's editors at a genetics meeting and urged
her not to publish it without a rebuttal. Science editor Daniel Koshland
agreed, commissioning a rebuttal by Kidd and Ranajit Chakraborty at the
University of Texas, which was published in the same issue. Koshland
also called Lewontin a few days after the genetics meeting, asking for re-
visions in the [previously peer-reviewed and accepted] paper, which was
already in galleys.1
Not only was the rebuttal article published in the same issue,144 it
appeared before the Lewontin and Hart article. And then, as
Levy notes, "all hell broke loose. '4
Levy recounts much of this controversy. Nevertheless, he
also omits significant parts of the story. For example, other sci-
entists vigorously criticized Science's conduct: "I am appalled...
It seems to me inconceivable that scientists would attempt to
suppress publication of a paper because they disagreed with its
conclusions, a paper which apparently had gone through what
one assumes was a normal and stringent review process ... ,,146
This writer also raised the specter of conflict of interest. An-
other scientist also expressed concern:
[S]urely it is not often that an Editor insists on revisions to the galleys of
an article accepted after peer review. Even more remarkable (and all
credit is no doubt due to the Editor) is to commission a rebuttal to the
article and to publish it contemporaneously. Save for an uncritical ac-
count filtered through staff reporter (Leslie Roberts), oddly missing has
been direct comment, so often heard on other issues, from the Editor
who stands at the center (or more accurately to one side) of the contro-
'0 Leslie Roberts, Science in Court: A Culture Clash, 257 ScI. 732, 735 (1992) [herein-
after Roberts, Science in Court].
. Ranajit Chakraborty & Kenneth K. Kidd, The Utility of DNA Typing in Forensic
Work, 254 Sci. 1735 (1991).
LEvw, supra note 1, at 111.
14' Lynwood R. Yarbrough, Letter to the Editor, 255 ScI. 1052 (1992) (University of
Kansas School of Medicine).
"
47As Yarbrough notes:
The vehemence and lack of scientific objectivity that appear to surround this is-
sue indicate that there may be important concerns other than scientific ones. I
urge that Science obtain from those most closely involved in this debate informa-
tion about possible economic interests in DNA typing and provide this informa-
tion to the reader, as otherjournals have sometimes done.
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versy. Having first stirred the pot, where was he when it came time to eat
the meal, be it cake or crow?'4
The peer review process, if not manipulated, was distorted.
Moreover, in discussing this controversy, Levy does not
seem to appreciate how much the lines between science and law
had blurred.'4 9 Dr. Kidd defended his actions as follows: "I felt
publishing the article would create a very serious problem in the
legal system, and that that was their intent."150 This statement il-
lustrates a nonscientific motivation. Similarly, Caskey, who had
recommended the rebuttal article and was a member of Science's
board of reviewing editors, said that "he was concerned that
'publishing defense testimony in a scientific journal' gives it
such weight that courts might reopen, perhaps to overturn con-
victions obtained on the basis of DNA evidence."' 5' Here, again,
is a nonscientific motivation, and a peer-reviewed article in a top
scientific journal is reduced to "defense testimony." It may not
be possible to separate science and law in such disputes, but
these statements raise troublesome issues for a judicial system
relying increasingly on scientific knowledge. 15 2
' Don W. Cleveland, Letter to the Editor; 255 Sci. 1052 (1992) (Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity School of Medicine). Koshland responded to this challenge:
The decision to publish Lewontin and Hard's article and accompanying Perspec-
tive [rebuttal] was guided by our desire to present to our readers the best and
most up-to-date developments in contemporary science. Our judgments were
consistent with our overall philosophy that the pages of Science should reflect the
most accurate view of highly controversial scientific issues.
Id. at 1053.
"' Lewontin and Hartl accused Koshland of "caving into political pressure by
commissioning the Chakraborty-Kidd rebuttal." Leslie Roberts, Fight Erupts Over DNA
Fingerprinting, 254 Sci. 1721, 1721 (1991). Lewontin characterized the use of the re-
buttal article as, "'[p]ure politics .... I think it is quite extraordinary that an editor
would go out and hire two guys to write a rebuttal' after the article had been peer re-
viewed and accepted." Leslie Roberts, Was Science Fair to its Authors?, 254 Scd. 1722
(1991) [hereinafter Roberts, Was Science Fair to its Authors?].
150 Roberts, Was Science Fair to its Authors?, supra note 149, at 1722.
"' Christopher Anderson, DNA Fingerprinting Discord, 354 NATURE 500 (1991).
Also, the article reports that "Caskey is a prominent supporter of DNA fingerprinting
who licenses his techniques to Cellmark Diagnostics, one of the largest DNA finger-
printing companies." Id.
,5' Attorneys also crossed over and published their views in scientific journals. See,
e.g., Rockne P. Harmon, Letter to the Editor, 261 Sci. 13 (1993) ("Hard and Lewontin's
misuse of legal history to bolster their scientific opinions will only guarantee more
contentiousness and controversy.").
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The Science controversy was not an isolated incident. An-
other dispute over a DNA article arose at a second journal. In
November 1991, Professor Seymour Geisser, a statistician at the
University of Minnesota, submitted a paper on the forensic use
of DNA statistics to the American Journal of Human Genetics. One
of the anonymous peer reviewers, who strongly recommended
against publication, was Dr. Ranajit Chakraborty, who had co-
authored the rebuttal article in Science'5 and had been aligned
with the prosecution in court cases. Moreover, Charles Epstein,
the Editor, wrote to Geisser commenting: "since this work will
certainly be used in court cases, the writing needs to be more
careful."154  Later, Epstein would write that his journal had
"served as an open forum on the forensic uses of DNA technol-
ogy. We have published highly 'partisan' but nevertheless care-
fully reviewed papers on all sides of the issue."'55 Geisser later
wrote:
Both [Chakraborty and the second referee, Bruce Weir] have frequently
submitted reports and testified for the prosecution when FBI DNA pro-
files were at issue. I have testified for the defense in some of these cases.
They have collaborated with FBI forensic workers, gained access to their
data, and have published it. Certainly they should have recused them-
selves from serving as referees, or at the very least informed the editor of
their situation.
15 6
Here, again, this incident--"highly partisan" scientific articles,
conflict of interest, and FBI control of data-is unprece-
dented.
The publication of the National Academy of Science's first
DNA report5 8 also sparked controversy. The report proposed a
' See Chakraborty & Kidd, supra note 144,
4 Ethics Report, supra note 142, at 2.
,5 Id. at 5 (comments of CharlesJ. Epstein, Editor).
156 Id.
"' In January 1992, Geisser was scheduled to testify as a defense DNA witness. He
"received a fax from [the prosecutor] demanding that he produce in court any
manuscript he authored, whether accepted or under review .... [F]ifteen minutes
after receiving that fax, [he] received a fax from ... Epstein .... along with com-
ments from three anonymous reviewers, one of whom strongly recommended against
publication." Ethics Report, supra note 142, at 2. Epstein later wrote that this incident
was "sheer coincidence." Id. at 4.
"a CommrEE ON DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FoRENsIc SCIENCE, NATIONAL REs. CoUNCIL,
DNA TECHNOLOGYIN FORENsIc SCIENCE (1992) [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
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method, known as the "ceiling principle," as a partial solution to
problems associated with the use of statistical evidence in
court. 159 The debate over the ceiling principle was intense and
acrimonious. There were attacks' 6° and counterattacks,1 61 fol-
lowed by rebuttals 62 and surrebuttals.ss As Levy recounts,
"[S] cientists fighting for principle displayed an intensity, even a
savagery, unmatched by the most aggressive lawyers. '"' While
Levy discusses the "ceiling principle" battles, he omits other
problems. First, a "confidential" draft of the report was leaked
to the FBI.Iss Second, Dr. Thomas Caskey, a member of the
" See Richard Lempert, DNA, Science and the Law: Two Cheers for the Ceiling Principle,
34JURiM:ETRiCSJ. 41 (1993).
'60 See Peter Aldhous, Geneticists Attack NRC Report As Scientifically Flawed, 259 Sci.
755 (1993); Bruce Devlin et al., Statistical Evaluation of DNA Fingerprinting: A Critique of
the NRC's Report, 259 Sc. 748 (1993); see also Bruce Devlin et al., Comments on the Statis-
tical Aspects of the NRC's Report on DNA Typing, 39 J. FORENSIC Soa. 28 (1994) (elaborat-
ing the statistical details of the authors' earlier critique of the NRC report).
161 "The critique that B. Devlin et al.... aim at the NRC report on DNA typing is it-
self open to some criticism." Richard C. Lewontin & Daniel Hartl, Letter to the Editor,
260 Sot. 473 (1993).
6 2 See Ranajit Chakraborty, Letter to the Editor, 260 Sc. 1059 (1993); Bruce Devlin et
al., Letter to theEditor, 260 SC. 1057 (1993).
16' SeeEric S. Lander, Letter to the Editor, 260 SCt. 1221 (1993).
16 LEvw, supra note 1, at 106.
6 TheJournal of NIH Research explained:
[FBI lab director] Hicks says that after the Oregon case, two members of the
NAS committee gave him copies of a preliminary draft of the report. ... He says
the members of the committee who gave him preliminary copies of the report
were frustrated "that it was so unbalanced and lacked objectivity."
Because the FBI is one of the sponsors of the report (along with NIH, the Na-
tional Science Foundation, the State Justice Institute, the National Institute of
Justice, and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation), Hicks phoned Oskar Zaboraky and
wrote to John Burris to express his concerns. Zaborasky is the NAS study direc-
tor for the committee. Burris is the executive director of the NAS commission
on life sciences. Hicks says he urged the academy staff "to closely examine the
chapter" on DNA profiling statistics, but contends, "I was not directing them in
any way."
Burris and Zaborsky insist they never relayed Hicks' comments to members of
the committee....
Celia Hooper, Rancor Precedes National Academy of Science's DNA Fingerprinting Report, J.
NIH RES., Mar. 1992, at 76, 79-80.
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committee, resigned because of the appearance of a conflict of
interest due to his ties with one of the commercial DNA labs.166
The criticisms of its first Report were so strong67 that the
NAS commissioned a second report, which was published in
1 9 9 6 .1r" Yet, even this action was plagued by controversy. Ap-
parently, the NAS at first turned down the request for a second
report. After FBI Director William Sessions requested the sec-
ond report, it was put on the "fast track."169 Lewontin later
stated that the conclusions in the second report "were 'bought'
by the Department ofJustice.' 7 °
III. LESSONS LEARNED
The most important question to be drawn from the DNA
cases is: What have we learned? There are several ways to look
'66 See Roberts, Science in Cour supra note 143, at 733 ("Caskey's ties to Cellmark
Diagnostics led to his resignation from a committee of the National Academy of Sci-
ences .... "); see also Christopher Anderson, Conflict Concerns Disrupt Panels, Cloud Tes-
timony, 355 NATURE 753 (1992). Also, the Justice Department, through the National
Institute ofJustice, had awarded his school a $200,000 grant for DNA fingerprinting
research. Id.117 For a further discussion, see D.H. Kaye, The Forensic Debut of the National Research
Council's DNA Report: Population Structure, Ceiling Frequencies and the Need for Numbers, 34
JuRimETRicSJ. 369 (1994); David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics,
and the Courts, 7 HARv. J.L. & TECIH. 101 (1993); Kenneth R. Kreiling, DNA Technology
in Forensic Science, 33JuRImETRICSJ. 449 (1993) (Review of NAS Report). See also Ken-
neth R. Kreiling, Comment: The National Research Council Report on Forensic DNA, in
SHEPARD'S EXPERT & SCr. EVIDENCE 507 (1994).
' CommrEE ON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN UPDATE, NATIONAL RES. COUNCIL,
THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996). The 1992 report "did not
eliminate all controversy. Indeed, in propounding what the committee regarded as a
moderate position-the ceiling principle and the interim ceiling principle-the report itself
became the target of criticism from scientists and lawyers on both sides of the debate
on DNA evidence in the courts." Id. at I (emphasis in original).
'6 As Neufeld notes:
The Bureau's request went through the normal Academy channels and was ini-
tially rejected. Undaunted by this rejection, Director Sessions reiterated his re-
quest, this time formally to the president of the Academy, with an offer to
underwrite the project. The normal procedures were dispensed with .... So
much for the integrity of the Bureau and the independence of science.
See Neufeld, supra note 72, at 197.
'70 Eliot Marshall, Academy's About-Face on Forensic DNA, 272 ScI. 803 (1996). See also
Rorie Sherman, New Scrutiny for DNA Typing, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1993, at 3 (Defense
attorney Peter Neufeld stated, "It's offensive that law enforcement can be dictating to
the independent scientific community how they should examine problems.").
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back on the DNA controversy. The first view is that the propo-
nents of DNA evidence were correct from the beginning, and al-
though there were various "setbacks" along the way, the
proponents were eventually vindicated. Under this view, the
setbacks are marginalized as "technical" problems. I am afraid
that Levy's book can be read as affirming this view, although the
reader would have to ignore many of Levy's caveats. I believe
this view is wrong. The significant lesson is not that DNA evi-
dence eventually succeeded, but how the courts dealt with this
evidence in the early cases. Before the advent of DNA, prosecu-
tors advocated the admissibility of paraffin test results,'7' voice-
print evidence,' 72 and hypnotically-refreshed testimony. T3 These
prosecutors were undoubtedly just as confident about the validly
of those techniques-and they were wrong. A number of signifi-
cant legal issues arose in the early DNA cases, including (1) use
of improper scientific procedures, (2) insufficient pretrial dis-
covery, (3) difficulty obtaining defense experts, and (4) lack of
independent scientific studies.
A. SCIENTIFIC PROCEDURES
People v. Castro"74 was the first reported case to successfully
challenge the validity of DNA evidence. Some DNA proponents
minimize the importance of Castro, noting that the accused
eventually plead guilty'75 and that the Castro ruling was limited
because the court accepted the general validity of DNA evi-
dence; it ruled only that the results in Castro were inadmissible.
Nevertheless, the deficiencies in the DNA procedures were by
no means minor or technical. The court wrote: "In a piercing
attack upon each molecule of evidence presented, the defense
was successful in demonstrating to this court that the testing
laboratory failed in its responsibility to perform the accepted
scientific techniques and experiments. '' 7T  Significantly, the
171 See 1 GLANNELU & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 1, at 395-97.
172 See id& ch. 10.
'' See id at 336-48.
'7 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
171 See MONES, supra note 57, at 310 ("Interestingly, however, Mr. Castro eventually
pleaded guilty.").
176 Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
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prosecution and defense experts met out-of-court and issued a
joint statement, including the following: "[T]he DNA data in
this case are not scientifically reliable enough to support the as-
sertion that the samples ... do or do not match. If this data
were submitted to a peer reviewed journal in support of a con-
clusion, it would not be accepted. Further experimentation
would be required."'
77
After Castro was decided,178 the National Academy of Sci-
ence's first DNA report recommended stringent lab procedures:
written lab protocols; objective and quantitative procedures for
identifying DNA patterns; clearly defined procedures for declar-
ing a match; and methods for identifying potential artifacts.'7
Later, the FBI's top DNA expert, Dr. Bruce Budowle, would ac-
knowledge these deficiencies:
The initial outcry over DNA typing standards concerned laboratory prob-
-lems: poorly defined rules for declaring a match; experiments without
controls; contaminated probes and samples; and sloppy interpretation of
autoradiograms. Although there is no evidence that these technical fail-
ings resulted in any wrongful convictions, the lack of standards seemed
to be a recipe for trouble.18'
In addition, there was no mandatory proficiency testing.8 1 The
NAS report also addressed this issue: "No laboratory should let
'77Eric Lander, DNA Fingerprinting On Tria4 339 NATURE 501,504 (1989).
" There were also other early troubles. In State v. MacLeod, the prosecutor with-
drew the DNA evidence after the defense successfully challenged Lifecodes' proce-
dure for dealing with band shifting. See Colin Norman, Maine Case Deals Blow to DNA
Fingerprinting 246 Sca. 1556 (1989).
In New York v. Neysmith, the defendant hired Lifecodes to compare his blood with
semen samples from the crime scene. The laboratory excluded the defendant based
on its results. The prosecutor then obtained a court order for a second test. Life-
codes reported that the second sample did not match the first sample submitted.
Blood and semen samples were then sent to Cellmark, which confirmed Lifecodes'
original exclusion of the defendant. Lifecodes later admitted to the prosecutor that
an error had occurred. See Lander, supra note 177, at 505.
' NAS REPORT, supra note 158, at 52-55.
Lander & Budowle, supra note 85, at 735.
"'The California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors had conducted volun-
tary proficiency tests:
With respect to blind trials of forensic DNA testing in the United States, CACLD
organized trials using case-simulated samples in 1987 and 1988. The three major
commercial facilities then performing forensic DNA analysis participated in each
trial. In the first trial, out of 50 samples, 2 firms each declared 1 false match that
could have resulted in the conviction of an innocent person. The errors apparently
1997]
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its results with a new DNA typing method be used in court, un-
less it has undergone such proficiency testing via blind trials."182
Lifecodes, the commercial laboratory that performed the
tests in Castro, had previously conducted DNA analysis in the
multiple prosecutions of Timothy Spencer.13  These prosecu-
tions illustrate the power of DNA evidence. Four brutal rape-
murders in different parts of Virginia were tied together
through the DNA evidence. Spencer also highlights the stakes
involved; the defendant was found guilty and was executed in
1994.184 There is no reason to believe that Lifecodes did a better
job in Spencer than it did in Castro.'5 Levy describes Castro as a
"public relations debacle," but then, to his credit, notes: "More
significant, there was an unquestioned need for standards to
guarantee the reliability of DNA testing, particularly testing
done by the commercial laboratories run for profit .... i186
The importance of written protocols and adherence to
proper procedure would later be demonstrated by Fred Zain,
arose from sample handling problems. The third company declared no false
matches. In the second trial, one company again reported an incorrect match.
OTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 79-80 (emphasis added).
.8 NAS REPORT, supra note 158, at 55.
"' See Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 775 (Va. 1989) (death of Susan
Tucker), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990), habeas corpus denied sub. nom. Spencer v.
Murray, 18 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 1994); Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785 (Va.
1989) (death of Debbie Davis), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990), habeas corpus denied
sub. nom. Spencer v. Murray, 5 F.3d 758 (4th Cir. 1994); Spencer v. Commonwealth,
385 S.E.2d 850 (Va. 1990) (death of Dr. Susan Helleans), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093
(1990), habeas corpus denied sub. nom. Spencer v. Murray, 18 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 1994);
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609 (Va. 1990) (death of Diane Cho), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 908 (1990). See also MONES, supra note 57, at 310; C. Thomas Blair,
Comment, Spencer v. Commonwealth and Recent Developments in the Admissibility of
DNA Fingerprint Evidence, 76 VA. L. REV. 853 (1990) (discussing the DNA aspects of the
case).
8' Murderer Put to Death in Virginia: First U.S. Execution Based on DNA Tests, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 28, 1994, at Al.
... This is not to say that Spencer was innocent or that Lifecodes erred. The
defense had the evidence examined by another DNA laboratory, Cellmark, which
reached the same result. The defense also submitted samples under a fictitious name
to Lifecodes, which confirmed its original conclusion. See Spencer, 5 F.3d at 766.
Nevertheless, Lifecodes's procedures were seriously and unacceptably deficient.
Indeed, one of the prosecution witnesses in Spencer, Dr. Richard J. Roberts, later
signed the critical joint statement in Castro. See supra text accompanying note 177.
"' LEw, supra note 1, at 52.
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the former head serologist of the West Virginia State Police
crime laboratory. Zain falsified conventional serological test re-
sults in as many as 134 cases from 1979 to 1989.187 Defendants,
since exonerated, were sentenced to long prison terms based
upon his testimony. Ajudicial inquiry concluded that "as a mat-
ter of law, any testimonial or documentary evidence offered by
Zain at any time in any criminal prosecution should be deemed
invalid, unreliable, and inadmissible."1ss In 1989, Zain accepted
a serologist position with the County Medical Examiner's labo-
ratory in San Antonio, where he performed DNA profiling and
testified in death penalty cases. In State v. Alejandro,'9 Zain testi-
fied that the defendant's DNA profile matched the DNA found
on a rape victim's clothing, stating that it could "only have
originated from [Alejandro]."'" This testimony, on its face, is
suspect; DNA profiling, as powerful as it is, could not have posi-
tively identified one person. Subsequent DNA tests excluded
Alejandro as the assailant. ' 9' An independent investigator con-
cluded that Zain's work in Texas demonstrated inadequate
documentation "[i]n every case.' 92 In addition, Zain reached
conclusions without specifying the tests performed, used deft-
,' In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438
S.E.2d 501, 511 (W. Va. 1993).
1s Id. at 520 (the Report is reprinted after the opinion). In another passage, the
Report stated that Zain's conduct "strikes at the heart of the integrity of the State's
case in every prosecution in which Zain was involved." Id. at 519.
' See EXONERATED BYSCIENCE, supra note 33, at 34-35. Alejandro was later awarded
damages. See Matt Flores, Bexar Pays $250,000 Over False Conviction, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEws, Sept. 13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 9501799.
'90 EXONERATED BY SCIENCE, supra note 33, at 34.
III Alejandro was not Zain's only DNA case. As Professor Starrs notes:
[I]n 1991, on the murder prosecution ofJesus Flores for the murder of Donna
Mae Inlow, Zain's DNA report matching the accused's blood to that of semen on
the victim was contradicted by a report from Brian Wraxall submitted to the Dis-
trict Attorney of Brownwood, Texas that PCR testing had excluded Flores as the
donor of the sperm.
James E. Starrs, The Seamy Side of Forensic Science: The Mephitic Stain of Fred Salem Zain,
17 Sci. SLEurmNGREv. 1, 7 (1993).
'92 Mark Hansen, Lab Evidence Questioned, 80 A.B.A. J. 16, 16 (1994). Dr. Irving
Stone, Chief of the Physical Evidence Section, Southwestern Institute of Forensic Sci-
ence, Dallas, was the investigator. Dr. Stone commented: "I've never seen anything
like it before. It's more than just carelessness. It's patent disregard for normal lab
procedures." Forensic ChiefsJob Challenged in Verdict, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 7, 1993.
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The criminal justice system cannot adequately deal with sci-
entific evidence without pretrial discovery,' and good science is
the antithesis of "trial by ambush." More importantly, discovery
is not only a fairness issue but a quality control issue.95 From
the beginning, the justice system was plagued with discovery
problems.196 Levy omits any discussion on this topic.
As noted above, Spencer was the first person executed
based on DNA evidence. 197 When the defense sought discovery
of the prosecution expert's "work notes," which formed the ba-
sis of his report, the motion was denied. The Virginia Supreme
Court upheld this ruling.198  Why would a "scientist" want to
keep work notes secret? Why would a legal system permit him
to do so when a man's life is at stake?
Another illustration was the Yee case, discussed earlier as the
first DNA case involving the FBI protocols.' 99 In Yee, °° the gov-
ernment opposed discovery, even though the need for discovery
was underscored by the lack of "extensive independent scientific
"' Starrs, supra note 191, at 8.
See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44
VAND. L. REv. 791 (1991).
... People are more careful when they have to document what they do and when
they know that other experts may review their findings. See Symposium on Science
and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 643 (1984). As Professor Joseph
Peterson remarked:
Only a small percentage of the cases in anyjurisdiction go to trial, so the techni-
cians or scientists in the crime laboratories seldom are called upon to justify their
conclusions under rigorous cross-examination. I think the realization that their
work will not be reviewed--either by an independent scientist or by opposing
counsel and expert in court-decreases the care and completeness with which
examiners process evidence.
Id.
'96 See State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Minn. 1989) ("The fair trial and due
process rights are implicated when data relied upon by a laboratory in performing
[DNA] tests are not available to the opposing side for review and
cross-examination.").
"9 See Muiderer Put to Death in Virginia, supra note 184, at Al.
' Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 791 (Va. 1989).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
129 F.R.D. 629 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
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assessment and replication of the reliability of the procedures
that have been developed by the F.B.I."201 The defense sought
production of matching criteria, environmental insult studies,
population data, and proficiency tests. The most troubling as-
pect of the case concerns the reason the prosecution opposed
discovery in the first place. The prosecution simply argued that
these materials were not scientific reports under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16(a) (1) (D) and therefore were not subject
to discovery. They did not argue that the material was irrelevant
or that it would not help the defense.0 2 Interestingly, the day
after the discovery motion in Yee was argued, the FBI Crime
Laboratory Director wrote a letter to the New York Times, pro-
moting its DNA program:
The procedures employed in these tests have been carefully defined,
based on extensive studies. Our procedures and test results have passed
muster when subjected to close scrutiny in the scientific community and
the courts. The F.B.I. has encouraged wide review of the forensic use of
DNA technology through sponsorship of technical seminars and interna-
tional symposiums and support to studies conducted by the Office of
203Technology Assessment and the National Academy of Sciences.
It seems incongruous to trumpet the "wide review" of DNA pro-
cedures in the press and at the same time oppose discovery in
the courtroom.
204
There are other discovery cases, some of which upheld the
denial of discovery.20  The first NAS Report recommended
"' Id. at 631.
The federal magistrate granted the motion, but based his decision on Fed. R.
Grim. P. 16(C), which permits discovery of documents and tangible objects that are
material to the preparation of the defense. He ruled that "predicate materials" were
discoverable under this provision. Id. at 635.
2'John Hicks, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1990, at A24.
2" The reasofi for the prosecutor's conduct is tactical, of course, a motivation that
is inherent in the adversary system. Thus, the fault lies not with the prosecutor, but
with the rule. The federal rule was subsequently amended to require a summary of
the expert's testimony. See FED. R. CIlM. P. 16(a) (1) (E).
"s E.g., State v. Dykes, 847 P.2d 1214 (Kan. 1993) (denial of request for the data-
base used to determine DNA match did not deny a fair trial; defense argued that ac-
cused's "substantial" Cherokee ancestry made this data important); Sadler v. State,
846 P.2d 377 (Okla. Grim. App. 1993) (prosecution's failure to turn over "inconclu-
sive" DNA report did not violate Brady). But see People v. Davis, 601 N.Y.S.2d 174
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (due process violation for Lifecodes to refuse to disclose its
population data base for its "one in ten million" conclusion).
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"open discovery": "The prosecutor has a strong responsibility to
reveal fully to defense counsel and experts retained by the de-
fendant all material that might be necessary in evaluating the
evidence. 20 6 No doubt some defense lawyers make outrageous
demands for discovery, but judges have the authority to control
such abuses. °7
C. DEFENSE EXPERTS
In Ake v. Oklahoma,0 s the United States Supreme Court for
the first time recognized a due process right to expert assistance
for indigents. The Court wrote:
We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary showing that his
sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial,
the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a psychiatrist's as-
sistance on this issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one.209
Ake is a significant decision because up to 80% of all criminal
210defendants in this country are indigents.
2" NAS REPORT, supra note 158, at 146.
20' Prosecutors have also made extensive discovery requests. In State v. DeMarco,
646 A.2d 431 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (per curiam), a New Jersey appellate
court ruled that the prosecution may not compel discovery of DNA reports prepared
by the defendant's expert witness for other clients in unrelated cases. The prosecu-
tion issued a subpoena for all of Dr. Edward Blake's DNA reports that indicated the
existence of unexplained contamination. The court indicated that the work-product
rule would not apply and that applying the attorney-client privilege to reports gener-
ated outside of NewJersey would be problematic.
Nevertheless, the court issued a protective order under its discovery rule. The
court noted that:
Although we do not determine the applicability of the privileges or... [a] Sixth
Amendment analysis, their underlying policies inform our view of the issue. Dr.
Blake's reports contain private and critical information which should be shielded
from undue public exposure. Moreover, litigators, public and private, should
have access to the assistance of retained experts with a minimum of risk that
their reports, which otherwise have not been placed in the public domain, will
surface in unrelated litigation.
Id. at 436-37.
2' 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Ake's attorney requested a psychiatric evaluation at state
expense to prepare an insanity defense. The trial court refused, and although insan-
ity was the only contested issue at trial, no psychiatrist testified on this issue.
20 Id. at 74.
20 YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27 (8th ed. 1994) ("The
most complete national survey estimated the overall felony indigency rate at 48%,
and statistics from particular urban jurisdictions suggest rates in the 70-85% range.").
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The importance of Ake to a new and complex technique
such as DNA is self-evident. The first NAS Report commented:
"Because of the potential power of DNA evidence, authorities
must make funds available to pay for expert witnesses ....
Nevertheless, in "DNA cases in Oklahoma and Alabama, ... the
defense did not retain any experts, because the presiding judge
had refused to authorize funds.2 1 Other examples of trial
court refusals include Ex parte Dubos 1 s and Prater v. State.2 4 The
importance of defense DNA experts is illustrated by the O.J.
Simpson trial, where a prosecution expert, a leading population
geneticist, made a simple computation mistake that was revealed
only during cross-examination.
Further, there is a special need for outside experts when
novel scientific evidence is introduced. There was no defense
expert in Andrews v. State,16 the first reported appellate case
considering the admissibility of DNA evidence. Nor was there a
defense expert in Spencer, the first execution case.217 In Spencer,
the prosecution experts "testified unequivocally that there was
no disagreement in the scientific community about the reliabil-
ity of DNA print testing,2 18 and there was "no dissent whatsoever
in the scientific community. ' ,219 Later events, as Levy docu-
ments, completely undermined these statements.
The lack of defense experts in the early DNA cases is not
surprising. With novel scientific evidence there is often a delay
21 NAS REPORT, supra note 158, at 149. The Report also includes the following
passage: "Defense counsel must have access to adequate expert assistance, even when
the admissibility of the results of analytical techniques is not in question, because
there is still a need to review the quality of the laboratory work and the interpretation
of the results." Id. at 147.
2" Neufeld & Colman, supra note 136, at 53.
2' 662 So. 2d 1189, 1192-93 (Ala. 1995) (Ake due process violation for failure to
provide indigent defendant with funds for DNA expert).
214 820 S.W.2d 429, 439 (Ark. 1991) (trial judge's initial denial of motion for ap-
pointment of defense expert because no available funds was erroneous).
115 See David H. Kaye, Cross-Examining Science, 36 JURIMETRICS vii (1996) (Editor's
Page); John Horgan, High Profile: The Simpson Case Raises the Issue of DNA Reliability,
Sci. AM., Oct. 1994, at 33, 36.
216 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
217 See supra text accompanying notes 183-84 (discussing the Spencer case).
2'8 Spencer v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 785, 792 (Va. 1989).
2'9 Id. at 797.
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before independent experts appreciate how science is being
used in the courtroom.2 0 When "voiceprint" evidence was in-
troduced in the early 1970s, the same problem arose. A Na-
tional Academy of Sciences voiceprint report noted that a
"striking fact about the trials involving voicegram evidence to
date is the very large proportion in which the only experts testi-
fying were those called by the state."22' Courts should not use
the lack of defense experts as proof that a technique is accepted
in the scientific community.
D. INDEPENDENT STUDIES
Perhaps the most serious problem with the early DNA cases
was the absence of independent scientific studies. The Office of
Technology Assessment report was published in 1990.222 The
first NAS report was published in 1992.223 The second NAS re-
port was issued in 1996, after Spencer's execution. The scien-
tific studies should precede, not follow, the court cases.
Unlike Levy, I believe that the United States Supreme
Court's 1993 decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.224 would have caused serious problems for DNA evidence in
2" One of the justifications for the Fye rule, which required the scientific tech-
nique to gain "general acceptance" in the scientific community as a prerequisite to
admissibility, focused on this point. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923). The Frye test guaranteed that "a minimal reserve of experts exists who can
critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular case."
United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Frye test was su-
perseded by the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
500 U.S. 579 (1993).
221 NAS REPORT, supra note 99, at 49. See also People v. Chapter, 13 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) 2479 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1973) ("In approximately eighty percent of the
twenty-five [voiceprint] cases in which such expert testimony/opinion was admitted
there was no opposing expert testimony on the issue of reliability and general accept-
ability of the scientific community...").
222See OTA REPORT, supra note 3.
See NAS REPORT, supra note 158.
2' 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The case involved the admissibility of expert testimony
concerning whether Bendectin, an anti-nausea drug, causes birth defects. Levy refers
to Daubert as adopting a "more relaxed standard" of admissibility. LEw, supra note 1,
at 122. There is support for this view. Some courts view Daubert as a less stringent
standard than Frya See, e.g., United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663, 668-69 (2d Cir.
1995) ("The Federal Rules of Evidence, although concededly more liberal than the
Frye test, still require a determination that the proffered scientific evidence is both
relevant and reliable."); Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[Bly
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the 1980s. In place of the Frye test, Daubert substituted a reliabil-
ity test. Such a standard, in the Court's view, is derived from
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which uses the terms "scientific"
and "knowledge":
[I] n order to qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or assertion
must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed testimony must be
supported by appropriate validation-i.e., "good grounds," based on
what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert's testimony per-
tain to "scientific knowledge" establishes a standard of evidentiary reli-
ability.
In determining reliability, the Supreme Court specified a
number of relevant factors, including whether the scientific
theory or technique has been tested. Citing authorities on the
philosophy of science, the Court noted that a hallmark of sci-
ence is empirical testing.16 Another factor is whether a theory
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publica-
tionY.' The peer review and publication process, in the Court's
loosening the strictures on scientific evidence set by Frye, Daubert reinforces the idea
that there should be a presumption of admissibility."), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1869
(1996); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 568 (6th Cir. 1993) ("We find that the
DNA testimony easily meets the more liberal test set out by the Supreme Court in
Daubett-).
It is not my view, however. Daubert, properly understood, adopts a different, but
not a less stringent, standard of admissibility. Cases limiting the admissibility of pre-
viously well-established techniques such as handwriting and hair comparisons buttress
this position. See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (concluding that the "testimony at the Daubert hearing firmly established that
forensic document examination, despite the existence of a certification program,
professional journals and other trappings of science, cannot, after Dauber, be re-
garded as 'scientific... knowledge'"); Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529,
1558 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (excluding hair comparison while observing that the court
had been "unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any indication that expert hair com-
parison testimony meets any of the requirements of Dauber;" further, "[a]lthough the
hair expert may have followed procedures accepted in the community of hair experts,
the human hair comparison results in this case were, nonetheless, scientifically unre-
liable."), rev'd on other ground, Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1522-23 (10th Cir.
1997).
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
See id. at 593 (citing HFEMPL, PmLOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 49 (1966)
("[T]he statements constituting a scientific explanation must be capable of empirical
test.")); see also KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REPUTATIONS: THE GRowTH OF
ScIENTIFIc KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) ("[]he criterion of the scientific status of a
theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.").
22 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
PAUL C. GIANNELLI
view, increased the likelihood that flaws in methodology will be
detected.22a
There is a serious question that the Daubert standard could
have been satisfied in the early DNA cases. For example, in
Yee the magistrate noted the lack of "extensive independent
scientific assessment and replication of the reliability of the pro-
cedures that have been developed by the F.B.I."230 as a reason for
pretrial discovery. The FBI's top DNA expert later recalled:
"When it first burst on the scene, the supporting scientific litera-
ture consisted of a mere handful of papers."031 The FBI's VNTR
Population Data: A Worldwide Study was published in 1993, three
years after FBI experts began testifying in court. The lack of
peer-reviewed articles and independent replication would have
raised a formidable obstacle to admissibility under Daubert.
E. LACK OF ACCESS
One other significant point surfaced during the out-of-court
battles discussed earlier.233 After submitting his article to the
American Journal of Human Genetics, Professor Geisser was asked
to obtain permission from the FBI to use their original data
rather than the data submitted by the FBI to defense attorneys
in court cases. Geisser then requested this data from Dr. Bu-
dowle, the top FBI DNA scientist. The FBI informed Geisser
22 A third factor is a technique's "known or potential rate of error." Id. As an ex-
ample the Court cited United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1989) (sur-
veying studies of the error rates for "voiceprints"). Fourth, the "existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation" is another indicia of
trustworthiness. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. As an example the Court cited United States
v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting professional organization's
standards governing "voiceprints"). Finally, "general acceptance" remains a factor in
assessing reliability. Although the Court rejected "general acceptance" as the sole cri-
terion for admissibility, it recognized its relevance in assessing the reliability of scien-
tific evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 ("Widespread acceptance can be an important
factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and 'a known technique that has been
able to attract only minimal support within the community' . .. may be viewed with
skepticism.").
2 See supra text accompanying notes 200-04 (discussing discovery opinion in Yee).
220 United States v. Yee, 129 F.R.D. 629, 631 (N.D. Ohio 1990).
21' Lander & Budowle, supra note 85, at 735.
212 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, VNTR POPULATION DATA: A WORLDWIDE
STUDY (1993).
222 See supra text accompanying notes 134-70.
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that (1) the FBI had made commitments earlier to other scien-
tists (Chakraborty, Devlin, Risch, and Weir) and therefore his
study must not conflict with their studies, (2) the FBI data may
be used only in a joint collaboration with Dr. Budowle, (3) the
use of the data was restricted to this one paper, and (4) all
authors must agree to the entire contents of a final manuscript
prior to submission to ajournal. Geisser later wrote that:
an independent study under such provisions would be totally compro-
mised, if not impossible.... [Moreoever,] Chakraborty, Devlin, Risch
and Weir have all published articles based on the FBI databases without
Budowle as a co-author.... Recently, I analyzed Cellmark databases for
a court in Ann Arbor, Michigan. At the insistence of Cellmark, the
prosecutor requested that the judge rule that I not be allowed to submit
my analysis of their data for publication. So much for open science!
IV. CONCLUSION
Harlan Levy's book is well-worth reading. He tackles an im-
portant subject and explains the subject in a clear and straight-
forward manner. He presents one view of the DNA story, a view
shared by many others, that the proponents were always correct
and the debunkers' objections were based upon technicalities.
Levy attempts to be fair and succeeds most of the time, noting
that the "critics of DNA analysis deserve plaudits for highlight-
ing these concerns. 2 5 Moreover, the prosecutors trying these
cases deserve credit. While litigating cases that could not wait
for the publication of independent scientific reports, they had
to learn a very complex technique, which was rapidly changing.
Indeed, the lawyering in the DNA cases was often superb by
both prosecutors and defense attorneys; this was not the case for
other scientific techniques. Finally, the FBI deserves credit for
implementing DNA profiling"-providing standards and deliver-
ing DNA technology to state and city crime laboratories.
Unfortunately, however, we did not learn the lessons from
the voiceprint cases. For example, in 1978, one court, in reject-
ing voiceprint evidence, stated:
It is certainly reasonable to expect science to withhold judgment on a
new theory until it has been well tested in the crucible of controlled ex-
254 Ethics Report, supra note 142, at 5.
.Y, supra note 1, at 198.
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perimentation and study. Such a procedure would require replication of
original experiments, and scrutiny of the results in various scientific
journals .... 236
Similarly, in the same year, another court noted, "What this
court finds disconcerting is the paucity of major tests and stud-
ies .... But to be assured that we have a scientific technique
which is valid and reliable we also need something more than
the bare results of one major study."237 In 1980, I argued for a
high burden of proof when the prosecution offers novel scien-
tific evidence because such a burden would require that "the
necessary resources [be] expended to validate new techniques.
The federal government possesses the capability of marshalling
those resources, of establishing independent tribunals, and of
conducting the validating research."238 I also cited the National
Academy of Sciences report on voiceprints as instructive: "The
evaluation of the voiceprint technique conducted by the Acad-
emy (at the request of the FBI) should have preceded, and not
followed, the proffer of voiceprint evidence."239 With DNA evi-
dence, the second NAS report was published after Spencer's
execution.
' People v. Collins, 405 N.Y.S.2d 369 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
27 D'Arc v. D'Arc, 385 A.2d 278, 283 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978).
" Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United
States, A Half-Century Later, 80 CoLuM. L. REv. 1197, 1249 (1980).
29 Id.
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